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ABSTRACT
Malware Detection using the Index of Coincidence
by Bhavna Gurnani
In this research, we apply the Index of Coincidence (IC) to problems in malware
analysis. The IC, which is often used in cryptanalysis of classic ciphers, is a technique
for measuring the repeat rate in a string of symbols. A score based on the IC is
applied to a variety of challenging malware families. We find that this relatively
simple IC score performs surprisingly well, with superior results in comparison to
various machine learning based scores, at least in some cases.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction to Malware
Malware [2] is an umbrella term for various kinds of malicious software. Such
programs are designed to harm computers in several ways including stealing personal
information, installing illegitimate software, reformatting hard drives, deleting files
and so on. Only six years after the launch of the first personal computer in 1975, the
world was presented with its first computer virus [13]. Ever since, malware has seemed
unstoppable. The rate with which malicious code and other unwanted programs
are released is increasing in comparison to the release rate of legitimate software
applications. In this paper, the terms virus and malware are used interchangeably.
1.2 Types of Malware
There has been an arms race between malware writers and anti-virus software
publishers. The most commonly and widely used malware detection technique is
signature detection [2]. In this technique, pattern matching is used to scan for par-
ticular byte patterns that are found in malware. If a matching pattern is found, the
file is categorized as malware. This is a very simple and often effective technique,
but malware writers have developed various techniques aimed at defeating signature
detection.
Encrypting the body of a virus can effectively defeat signature detection. How-
ever, the decryption routine is not encrypted, and can be susceptible to signature
scanning. As a result, malware authors created the polymorphic [14] and the meta-
morphic virus [6].
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A polymorphic virus includes an encrypted body and decryption code. Addition-
ally, polymorphic malware changes the decryption routine with each new infection,
making straightforward signature detection infeasible. However, anti-virus software
can use emulation to detect polymorphic malware. At some point the malware will
decrypt itself and at that point it will be vulnerable to signature detection.
Metamorphic malware are sometimes said to be “body polymorphic” [6], as they
morph the entire body of the malware with each new infection. This changes the inter-
nal structure and, if sufficiently thorough, it will defeat signature scanning. Encryp-
tion is not necessary, and hence is not used, in metamorphic malware. Metamorphic
code can employ a wide variety of code morphing strategies [10].
1.3 Techniques to detect malware
Proposed malware detection mechanisms rely on static analysis or dynamic analy-
sis or some combination thereof [1, 8, 12, 15]. In static analysis, the necessary features
are executed without executing the code. Examples of such features include opcode
sequences, entropy, and so on. In contrast, dynamic analysis extracts the features by
executing (or emulating) code. Dynamic features can be used to determine aspects
of the actual behavior of the code.
1.4 Technique used
This thesis is based on static analysis, including the opcode generation feature.
Different malware families are identified using a popular signature detection technique
known as the Index of Coincidence (IC).
The contents of this report are presented as follows. Chapter 2, briefly describes
the previous work and explains in detail about the Index of Coincidence and Chapter 3
2
its implementation. Chapter 4 includes several results after implementing IC and
Chapter 5 presents some observations based on the results. Chapter 6 concludes the
report.
3
CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1 Previous work and research
Cryptography is the technique of translating a piece of plain text to cipher text.
Classical ciphers are some of the simplest ciphers existing today. Most common forms
of classical ciphers are substitution ciphers and transposition ciphers. Substitution ci-
phers are then classified into monoalphabetic and polyalphabetic substitution ciphers.
Monoalphabetic ciphers are vulnerable to attacks and so are easily identified [9].
Alberti used this vulnerability of monoalphabetic ciphers to create polyalphabetic
ciphers [11], which were difficult to break for centuries.
Previous work includes the implementation of several techniques like the Simple
Substitution Distance and the Vigenère Cipher Score for the cryptanalysis of classical
ciphers for malware detection. Simple Substitution Distance (SSD), uses the hill
climbing [7] mathematical technique to first find or guess a possible solution and
then alters the solution to find a more efficient solution. A score is generated to
compare the previous and current solutions. If the current solution is better, then
an incremental change is made to the solution. Otherwise, the solution remains the
same.
The Vigenère Cipher is a polyalphabetic cipher that is formed by interweaving
a series of simple substitution ciphers [4]. To break the Vigenère cipher one needs
to first find the key length and then divide the cipher text into that many columns.
One can then derive the original key to decrypt the Vigenère cipher using frequency
analysis for each column,
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Index of Coincidence, also known as coincidence counting, will be implemented
in this project. This technique calculates the frequency of opcodes to measure the
score.
2.2 Index of Coincidence
Index of coincidence, usually used for cryptanalysis of classic ciphers, is a tech-
nique for measuring the repeat rate or frequency in a piece of text or a string of
symbols. Index of Coincidence [5] is defined as the probability of selecting the same
letter twice, when randomly selecting two letters from the piece of text under consid-
eration.
2.2.1 Calculation
The Index of Coincidence is calculated in several steps. First, the chance of
selecting a letter from the text is calculated. Mathematically, this is the frequency
a letter in the text divided by the length of the text. Next, the chance of selecting
the same letter without replacing the first drawn letter is calculated. This involves
dividing (frequency - 1) by (length -1). By multiplying these two values, the prob-
ability of that particular letter is obtained. In order to get the chances of two of a
kind from the text, we find the probability of each letter and sum those values. Then
by multiplying the sum with a normalizing coefficient, typically 26 for English, we
obtain the value of IC.
𝐼𝐶 = 𝑐 * ((𝑛𝑎
𝑁
* 𝑛𝑎 − 1
𝑁 − 1 ) + (
𝑛𝑏
𝑁
* 𝑛𝑏 − 1
𝑁 − 1) + ...+ (
𝑛𝑧
𝑁
* 𝑛𝑧 − 1
𝑁 − 1 )) (1)
where, 𝑐 is the normalizing coefficient, 𝑛𝑎 is the frequency of the letter ‘a’ in the text
and 𝑁 is length of the text. IC can also be calculated as mentioned in Equation 2.
5
𝐼𝐶 =
∑︀𝑐
𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝑁(𝑁−1)
𝑐
(2)
where, 𝑁 is the length of the text and 𝑛1 through 𝑛𝑐 are the frequencies of the first
𝑐 letters. Summation of 𝑛𝑖 should be equal to 𝑁 .
2.2.2 Application
IC is useful in the analysis of natural-language plaintext as well as ciphertext [5].
This technique is helpful even when the plaintext is not available and only the cipher-
text is present. During such times, coincidences in the ciphertext are caused since
they are present in the plain text as well. Coinciding counting is helpful in the crypt-
analysis of the Vigenère cipher. More details on the calculation of IC are covered in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Implementation
3.1 Choices Made in Calculation
Calculating IC mainly depends on different choices. From the last chapter, there
are three major choices involved in IC calculation.
∙ Value of the normalizing coefficient, 𝑐.
∙ Training family
∙ Testing family
The normalizing coefficient, as seen in the previous chapter, is the value or con-
stant with which the rest of the IC term is multiplied. For the English language, 𝑐
is equal to the number of distinct letters, which is 26. But, as the input here is a
set of opcodes, the letters will be replaced by the opcodes. So, different values of
𝑐 should be considered while calculating the value of IC. While calculating IC, the
distinct opcodes present in a family are obtained, so that the top 𝑐 opcodes can be
considered and the remaining opcodes are then combined into one category of ‘oth-
ers’. This process happens only for the training malware family. Whereas, once the
top 𝑐 opcodes are selected for the training family, only those opcodes are considered
for the testing family. The remaining opcodes in the testing family are combined into
one category of ‘others’.
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3.2 Process to calculate IC
The first step involved in calculating IC, is to get a sequence of opcodes from
the .asm files. This sequence of opcodes is considered to be the cipher text for the
generation of IC.
To train a family, unique opcodes and their frequencies are generated. The 𝑐
most frequent opcodes are considered. The remaining opcodes and their frequencies
are combined into one ‘other’ opcode. These top 𝑐 opcodes and the ‘other’ opcode are
then used to generate the IC of the training family. The opcodes considered during
this process are used for testing different files and families. Let us call these opcodes
as ‘considered_opcodes’.
Testing files of the training family includes calculating the frequency of distinct
opcodes in the file. Opcodes present in ‘considered_opcodes’ are considered and the
remaining opcodes and their frequency is summed into ‘other’ opcodes. Using these
opcodes, the IC for a family is generated. This process is repeated for each file in the
family.
For the final score calculation, the IC for both families and files are considered.
Let us call the score of family as 𝑥 and score of file as 𝑦. Then, the final score of the
file will be
|𝑧| = |𝑦 − 𝑥| (3)
where, |𝑧| is the absolute value of 𝑧, which is the final score of a file. The closer the
value is to 0, the better it matches the expected value for the family.
To test the testing family, all the opcodes from all the files in that family are
combined. Then, unique opcodes and their frequencies are generated. Using only
those opcodes which are present in ‘considered_opcodes’ the sum of the frequencies
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of the remaining opcodes in ’other’ opcodes is calculated. Using the formula, the IC
for that family is calculated and the process is repeated for the test family. Once the
final scores for all the files in both families are obtained, ROC curves and AUC values
are generated [3] as described in the next chapter.
9
CHAPTER 4
Results
Several results were obtained based on different malware families like NGVCK,
harebot, zbot, zeroaccess, cleaman, cridex. The datasets considered in this project
are shown in Table 1.
Family Number of files Distinct opcodes
NGVCK 200 79
Harebot 54 207
Zeroaccess 230 412
Zbot 242 320
Security Shield 59 177
Winwebsec 161 334
Smart HDD 69 85
Cridex 75 254
Cygwin 40 196
Benign 40 117
Table 1: Dataset
To generate results and to decide the value of the normalizing coefficient, distinct
opcodes of each malware family were obtained. Hence, the count of the distinct
opcodes was also included in Table 1.
Considering the NGVCK and the Benign datasets, and using different values of
𝑐, some IC scores were computed and plotted as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
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Figure 1: NGVCK-Benign scatter plot, 𝑐 is 26
Figure 2: NGVCK-Benign scatter plot, 𝑐 is 30
Observing the graph, there is no clear distinction between the two families.
Hence, for more clarity, AUC values and ROC curves were generated. Results were
11
classified into different categories like variations in the values of the normalizing co-
efficient or different combinations of training and testing datasets.
4.1 With variation of normalizing coefficient
In this section, the results were calculated with different values of the normalizing
coefficient. To generate results NGVCK is used as the training dataset and Benign
is used as the testing dataset. Unique opcodes in the training dataset were found to
determine the range for the value of 𝑐. There were 79 unique opcodes in NGVCK, so
the values of 𝑐 cannot exceed 79. AUC were generated with different values of 𝑐 and
plotted as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
Figure 3: ROC curve for 𝑐 as 26
12
𝑐 Training dataset Testing dataset AUC
26 NGVCK Benign 0.92725
Table 2: Parameters for 𝑐 as 26
Figure 4: ROC curve for 𝑐 as 79
𝑐 Training dataset Testing dataset AUC
79 NGVCK Benign 0.93425
Table 3: Parameters for 𝑐 as 79
AUC generated with different values of 𝑐 are given in Table 4.
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𝑐 Training dataset Testing dataset AUC
79 NGVCK Benign 0.93425
63 NGVCK Benign 0.933125
50 NGVCK Benign 0.93325
45 NGVCK Benign 0.933375
34 NGVCK Benign 0.931875
12 NGVCK Benign 0.7775
6 NGVCK Benign 0.7825
Table 4: Results with different normalizing coefficients
In order to obtain a pattern where the result changes, graphs were plotted as
shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
Figure 5: AUC with different normalizing coefficients: line graph
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Figure 6: AUC with different normalizing coefficients: bar graph
For more observations, the results were computed with different values of the
normalizing coefficient for several training datasets, using benign as the test dataset.
The values computed for this scenario are given in Table 5 and plotted in Figure 7.
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𝑐 Training dataset Testing dataset AUC
117 Harebot Benign 0.7124521
117 Zeroaccess Benign 0.7124521
117 Zbot Benign 0.455735
79 NGVCK Benign 0.93425
79 Harebot Benign 0.3
79 Zeroaccess Benign 0.7127011
79 Zbot Benign 0.456449
63 NGVCK Benign 0.933125
63 Harebot Benign 0.3023585
63 Zeroaccess Benign 0.712318
63 Zbot Benign 0.456
50 NGVCK Benign 0.93325
50 Harebot Benign 0.3037736
50 Zeroaccess Benign 0.7130651
50 Zbot Benign 0.4552903
45 NGVCK Benign 0.933375
45 Harebot Benign 0.3051887
45 Zeroaccess Benign 0.7132759
45 Zbot Benign 0.4566245
34 NGVCK Benign 0.931875
34 Harebot Benign 0.309434
34 Zeroaccess Benign 0.7147318
34 Zbot Benign 0.4566245
26 NGVCK Benign 0.92725
26 Harebot Benign 0.3188679
26 Zeroaccess Benign 0.7189464
26 Zbot Benign 0.4560744
12 NGVCK Benign 0.7775
12 Harebot Benign 0.4462264
12 Zeroaccess Benign 0.6612069
12 Zbot Benign 0.3904846
2 NGVCK Benign 0.8035
2 Harebot Benign 0.4820755
2 Zeroaccess Benign 0.6356897
2 Zbot Benign 0.03591994
Table 5: Results with different 𝑐 and training datasets
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Figure 7: Different 𝑐 and train dataset across benign
It was observed that there is an increase in AUC with the increase in value of
the normalizing coefficient. So, one can summarize the above results by saying that
the value of 𝑐 is directly proportional to the AUC. But, the values of AUC differ
with each training dataset. This indicates that the occurrence of opcodes and their
distribution plays an important part in determining the AUC.
4.2 With variation of Train dataset
In this section the values of 𝑐 (26) and test dataset (Benign) are constant. The
training dataset changes from NGVCK to Zeroaccess to Smart HDD. IC was calcu-
lated with these parameters and ROC curves were generated as shown in Figure 8
and Figure 9.
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Figure 8: ROC curve for NGVCK as training dataset
𝑐 Training dataset Testing dataset AUC
26 NGVCK Benign 0.92725
Table 6: Parameters for NGVCK as training dataset
18
Figure 9: ROC curve for Zeroaccess as training dataset
𝑐 Training dataset Testing dataset AUC
26 ZeroAccess Benign 0.7189
Table 7: Parameters for Zeroaccess as training dataset
Some more results were computed based on the above scenario and are given in
Table 8.
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𝑐 Training dataset Testing dataset AUC
26 NGVCK Benign 0.92725
26 NGVCK Cleamen 0.95875
26 NGVCK Cridex 0.9235135
26 ZeroAccess Benign 0.7189464
26 Smart HDD Benign 0.6551471
26 Security Shield Benign 0.512931
26 Winwebsec Benign 0.4600287
26 Zbot Benign 0.4560744
26 Cridex Benign 0.4351351
26 Cleamen Benign 0.4132
26 Harebot Benign 0.3188679
Table 8: Results with different training datasets
These results were generated by changing the training dataset. So, to make the
results more visually clear and to find the pattern in the result, bar graph was plotted
as shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10: AUC by different training datasets
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The above graph shows that the NGVCK training dataset has the highest AUC
value of 0.9273, whereas zeroaccess, smart HDD and security shield have AUC values
0.7189, 0.6551 and 0.5129 respectively, all of which are above 0.5. This means that
the IC score did a pretty good job with NGVCK as training dataset and a moderately
good job with families like zeroaccess, smart hdd and security shield. Other families,
when used as the training dataset were not detected accurately with the IC score.
4.3 With variation of Test dataset
Similar to the above two sections, the results in this section were computed by
changing the values of the test dataset and the training dataset and the normalizing
coefficient were constant. Several families like Cridex and Cleaman were considered
and AUC values were computed. ROC curves were plotted as shown in Figure 11 and
Figure 12
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Figure 11: ROC curve for Cridex as test dataset
𝑐 Training dataset Testing dataset AUC
26 NGVCK Cridex 0.92351
Table 9: Parameters for Cridex as test dataset
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Figure 12: ROC curve for Cleaman as test dataset
𝑐 Training dataset Testing dataset AUC
26 NGVCK Cleaman 0.95875
Table 10: Parameters for Cleaman as test dataset
The AUC of all the scenarios considered were combined into the Table 11.
𝑐 Training dataset Testing dataset AUC
26 NGVCK Benign 0.92725
26 NGVCK Cridex 0.92351
26 NGVCK Cleaman 0.95875
Table 11: Results with different testing datasets
A bar graph has been plotted for the above generated AUC values as shown in
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Figure 13.
Figure 13: AUC by different testing datasets
As the IC was able to detect well with NGVCK as training dataset and benign
as a testing dataset in the previous section, experiments were made to change the
testing dataset and generate the IC. On observing the graph above, it can be said
that all the three test datasets were detected really well when the training dataset
was NGVCK.
4.4 Summary of results
On observing the above results and graphs, it can be said that IC scores are
highly dependent on the choices made. If the values are chosen in an accurate way,
IC can give better results, which helps in differentiating between two different malware
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families or between a malware family and a benign family. Please refer to appendix A
to find the ROC curves for the results generated in the previous sections.
4.5 Comparison with other scores
To check the performance of IC, comparison of the results with different scores
like the Vigenère cipher score and the simple substitution distance technique (SSD)
were made. Table 12 contains values of the AUC generated for the different scores
and a graph was plotted for these values as shown in Figure 14.
Malware AUC using AUC using AUC using
Family IC score Vigenère Cryptanalysis score SSD
NGVCK 0.92725 0.99 1
Zbot 0.4560744 0.9729 0.8664
Winwebsec 0.4600287 0.9996 0.8374
Smart HDD 0.6551471 0.9958 0.8855
Cridex 0.4351351 0.9458 0.5830
Security Shield 0.512931 0.5979 0.6290
Harebot 0.3188679 0.9057 0.5606
Zeroaccess 0.7189464 0.6588 N/A
Table 12: Comparison across different scores
Figure 14: Comparing results with different scores
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Based on the above graph, it can be observed that the IC does not perform as
well as the other scores, as only one factor is involved in the calculation of the IC i.e.
the frequency of opcodes.
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CHAPTER 5
Observations
A few observations were made based on the results obtained in the previous
chapter.
5.1 Observation 1:
IC is based on the frequency of opcodes and better results can be obtained only
when the top 𝑐 opcodes from both the training and the test dataset match.
To support the above observation, the percentage of matching opcodes for each
malware family was computed across the benign set and plotted against the percent-
age of AUC.
Family % of matching opcodes % of AUC
NGVCK 56.96202532 92.725
Harebot 43.47826087 31.88679
Zeroaccess 24.75 71.89464
Zbot 30 45.60744
Security Shield 29.37853107 51.2931
Winwebsec 29.64071856 46.00287
Smart HDD 48.23529412 65.51471
Cridex 36.61417323 43.51351
Cleaman 31.63265306 41.32
Table 13: Percentage of matching opcodes
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Figure 15: Percentage of matching opcodes
Figure 15 tells us that for most of the families, the aforementioned observation
holds true. But, for families like Harebot and Zeroaccess this scenario is not true.
5.2 Observation 2:
IC can be based on the percentage of frequency of ‘other’ opcodes. To check
whether this observation holds true, statistics were computed as given in Table 14.
Family % frequency of ‘other’ opcodes % of AUC
NGVCK 4.625928727 92.725
Harebot 6.265612543 31.88679
Zeroaccess 5.321108647 71.89464
Zbot 7.375108016 45.60744
Security Shield 4.183405127 51.2931
Winwebsec 3.787141968 46.00287
Smart HDD 0.289318786 65.51471
Cridex 6.522573331 43.51351
Cleaman 11.36468728 41.32
Table 14: Frequency percentage of ‘other’ opcodes
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The above values were computed with 26 as the value of the normalizing coeffi-
cient. These values were plotted on a line graph, as shown in Figure 16, to check how
the different families perform when the percentage of other opcodes across percentage
of AUC was considered.
Figure 16: Frequency percentage of ’other’ opcodes
Figure 16 does not exactly show the relation between the frequency of other
opcodes to the values of AUC. This indicates that the observation does not hold true.
5.3 Observation 3:
IC can be based on the distribution of opcodes across the malware family. Dis-
tribution of a particular opcode was calculated by first calculating the frequency of
that opcode in both the malware and the benign family. Then, the difference in their
squares are calculated and then by square root of the final value is obtained. For
example, if the frequency of an opcode, say “mov”, in the malware family is 𝑥 and its
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frequency in the benign family is 𝑦, then the distribution can be calculated as
Opcode Distribution = (𝑥2 − 𝑦2)1/2 (4)
Using equation 4, results were obtained and a line graph was plotted as shown
in Figure 17. Here, the value of the normalizing coefficient is 26 and the test dataset
is benign.
Figure 17: Opcode Distribution across families
By observing Figure 17, it can be said that the opcodes in NGVCK are distributed
evenly. However, the opcodes in other families either start really high or really low,
which denotes an uneven distribution. So, it can be said that the distribution of
opcodes is an important factor for IC to perform better.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
It can be said that the effectiveness of the IC score highly depends on the value of
the normalizing coefficient, the training dataset and its corresponding test datasets.
If these values are set properly, then the family of an unknown file can be effectively
identified.
Based on the observations in the previous chapter, we can conclude that the value
of IC is highly related to the distribution of opcodes across the different families.
Future work can focus on the calculation of "kappa" IC [5]. It is calculated using
the null hypothesis, which states that at any given point in time, the expected no-
correlation value is 1.0. Thus, the IC can be calculated as the coincidences observed
divided by the coincidences expected. So, the term becomes
𝐼𝐶 =
∑︀𝑁
𝑗=1[𝑎𝑗 = 𝑏𝑗]
𝑁
𝑐
(5)
where, 𝑁 is the common length of the two texts (say A and B), 𝑎𝑗 is the 𝑗𝑡ℎ term of
the text A, 𝑏𝑗 is the 𝑗𝑡ℎ term of the text B and the bracketed term is 1 if true and 0
if false.
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APPENDIX
Generated ROC Curves
c 26
train NGVCK
test Benign
Table A.15: Parameters NGVCK-Benign-26
Figure A.18: ROC Curve NGVCK-Benign-26
c 26
train NGVCK
test Cleaman
Table A.16: Parameters NGVCK-Cleaman-26
Figure A.19: ROC Curve NGVCK-Cleaman-26
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train NGVCK
test Cridex
Table A.17: Parameters NGVCK-Cridex-26
Figure A.20: ROC Curve NGVCK-Cridex-26
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train ZeroAccess
test Benign
Table A.18: Parameters ZeroAccess-Benign-26
Figure A.21: ROC Curve ZeroAccess-Benign-26
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c 26
train Smart HDD
test Benign
Table A.19: Parameters Smart HDD-Benign-26
Figure A.22: ROC Curve Smart HDD-Benign-26
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Table A.20: Parameters Security Shield-Benign-26
Figure A.23: ROC Curve Security Shield-Benign-26
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c 26
train Winwebsec
test Benign
Table A.21: Parameters Winwebsec-Benign-26
Figure A.24: ROC Curve Winwebsec-Benign-26
c 26
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Table A.22: Parameters Zbot-Benign-26
Figure A.25: ROC Curve Zbot-Benign-26
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c 26
train Cridex
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Table A.23: Parameters Cridex-Benign-26
Figure A.26: ROC Curve Cridex-Benign-26
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Table A.24: Parameters Cleaman-Benign-26
Figure A.27: ROC Curve Cleaman-Benign-26
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c 26
train Harebot
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Table A.25: Parameters Harebot-Benign-26
Figure A.28: ROC Curve Harebot-Benign-26
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Table A.26: Parameters NGVCK-Benign-79
Figure A.29: ROC Curve NGVCK-Benign-79
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c 79
train NGVCK
test Zbot
Table A.27: Parameters NGVCK-Zbot-79
Figure A.30: ROC Curve NGVCK-Zbot-79
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train NGVCK
test Benign
Table A.28: Parameters NGVCK-Benign-63
Figure A.31: ROC Curve NGVCK-Benign-63
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c 63
train NGVCK
test Security Shield
Table A.29: Parameters NGVCK-Security Shield-63
Figure A.32: ROC Curve NGVCK-Security Shield-63
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Table A.30: Parameters NGVCK-Benign-50
Figure A.33: ROC Curve NGVCK-Benign-50
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c 50
train NGVCK
test Winwebsec
Table A.31: Parameters NGVCK-Winwebsec-50
Figure A.34: ROC Curve NGVCK-Winwebsec-50
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Table A.32: Parameters NGVCK-Benign-45
Figure A.35: ROC Curve NGVCK-Benign-45
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train NGVCK
test Smart HDD
Table A.33: Parameters NGVCK-Smart HDD-45
Figure A.36: ROC Curve NGVCK-SmartHDD-45
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Table A.34: Parameters NGVCK-Benign-34
Figure A.37: ROC Curve NGVCK-Benign-34
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c 34
train NGVCK
test ZeroAccess
Table A.35: Parameters NGVCK-Zeroaccess-34
Figure A.38: ROC Curve NGVCK-Zeroaccess-26
c 12
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Table A.36: Parameters NGVCK-Benign-12
Figure A.39: ROC Curve NGVCK-Benign-12
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c 12
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test Harebot
Table A.37: Parameters NGVCK-Harebot-12
Figure A.40: ROC Curve NGVCK-Harebot-12
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Table A.38: Parameters NGVCK-Benign-6
Figure A.41: ROC Curve NGVCK-Benign-6
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